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Abstract—A novel class of extreme link-flooding DDoS (Dis-
tributed Denial of Service) attacks is designed to cut off entire
geographical areas such as cities and even countries from the
Internet by simultaneously targeting a selected set of network
links. The Crossfire attack is a target-area link-flooding attack,
which is orchestrated in three complex phases. The attack uses
a massively distributed large-scale botnet to generate low-rate
benign traffic aiming to congest selected network links, so-called
target links. The adoption of benign traffic, while simultaneously
targeting multiple network links, makes detecting the Crossfire
attack a serious challenge. In this paper, we present analytical
and emulated results showing hitherto unidentified vulnerabilities
in the execution of the attack, such as a correlation between co-
ordination of the botnet traffic and the quality of the attack, and
a correlation between the attack distribution and detectability of
the attack. Additionally, we identified a warm-up period due to
the bot synchronization. For attack detection, we report results
of using two supervised machine learning approaches: Support
Vector Machine (SVM) and Random Forest (RF) for classification
of network traffic to normal and abnormal traffic, i.e, attack
traffic. These machine learning models have been trained in
various scenarios using the link volume as the main feature set.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CROSSFIRE ATTACK
A novel class of extreme link-flooding DDoS (Distributed
Denial of Service) attacks [1] is the Crossfire attack, which is
designed to cut off entire geographical areas such as cities and
even countries from the Internet by simultaneously targeting
a selected set of network links [2], [3]. The most intriguing
property of this target-area link-flooding attack is the usage
of legitimate traffic flows to achieve its devastating impact
by making the attack particularly difficult to detect and,
consequently, to mitigate [4].
The Crossfire attack uses a complex and massively large-
scale botnet for attack execution [4]. A botnet is a network of
computers infected with malware (bots) that can be controlled
remotely. A command-and-control unit updates the bots by
sending them the commands of the botmaster, which is orches-
trating the attack by executing the attack procedure. The bots
direct their low-intensity flows to a large number of servers
in such a devastating manner that the targeted geographical
region is essentially cut off from the Internet.
The success of the attack depends highly on the network
structure and how the attacker plans and initiates the attack
sequence [5], [6]. The attacker aims to find a set of target links
which connects to the decoy servers such that if the target links
are flooded, traffic destined to the target area is prevented from
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Figure 1. The Crossfire attack traffic flows congest a small set of selected
network links using benign low-rate flows from bots to publicly accessible
servers, while degrading connectivity to the target area.
reaching its destination. Reciprocally, access from the target
area to Internet services outside the target area will be cut off.
For the adversary to achieve its goal, it chooses public servers
either inside of the target area or nearby the target area, which
can be easily found due to their availability. The quality of
the attack depends on the specific selection of servers and the
resulting links to be targeted, but also on the overall network
topology [7].
The Crossfire attack: The Crossfire attack consists of
three phases: (a) the construction of the link map, (2) the
selection of target links, and (c) the coordination of the
botnet. While phases (a) and (b) are sequentially executed
only initially, once triggered phase (c) is executed periodically.
Fig. 1 illustrates the dynamics of the Crossfire attack.
Link map construction: The initial step of the Crossfire
attack is the construction of the link map. The attacker crates
a map of the network along the ways from the attacker’s
bots to the servers using traceroute. The result of traceroute
inevitably consist of a record of different routes between the
same pairs of nodes, because of network-inherent elements
influencing the effective route chosen (e.g., ISP and load-
balancing). Subsequently, a link map is gradually constructed,
which exposes the network structure and the traffic flow
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behavior around the target area.
1) Target link selection: After the construction of the link
map, the adversary evaluates the data for more stable and
reliable routes to decide on its selection of the target links.
The adversary prefers disjoint routes with mostly independent
target links for the attack to create the biggest impact.
Bot coordination: In the final phase of the attack, the
adversary coordinates the bots to generate low-intensity traffic
and to send it to the corresponding decoy server. The targeted
aggregation of multiple low-intensity traffic flows on the target
link ideally exhausts its capacity, hence, congesting the link.
Because the Crossfire attack aims to congest the target links
with low-rate benign traffic, neither signature based Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) nor alternative traffic anomaly detec-
tion schemes are capable of detecting malicious behavior on
individual flows. The Crossfire attack’s detectibility can even
be further reduced by integrating any of the following features
into the attack: the attacker (a) gradually increases bot traffic
intensity, (b) estimates the decoy servers’ bandwidth to avoid
exceeding their bandwidth, (c) evenly distributes the traffic
over the decoy servers, (d) alternates the set of bots flooding
a target link, and (e) alternates the set of target links [4].
Although these techniques further sophisticate the attack,
research described in this paper focuses on the effort the
adversary has to invest for successful attack preparation and
execution. As it turns out, the inherent complexities of the at-
tack create also substantial execution obstacles, which exposes
the attack to detection vulnerabilities.
In this paper, we describe how the Crossfire attack has been
replicated in a realistic test bed emulation. The traffic has been
measured during the topology construction phase and attack
phase and analyzed for patterns and vulnerabilities of the
Crossfire attack. The results indicate that characteristic traffic
anomalies emerge in the attack region. Particularly, we found
a correlation between coordination of the botnet traffic and
the quality of the attack and a correlation between the attack
distribution and detectability of the attack. Additionally, we
show that due to the bot synchronization there is a warm-up
period after the attack is launched and before the target links
are overwhelmed. Because of this warm-up period and the
distinguishing patterns in the topology construction phase, the
obtained results pave the way for novel detection methods in
the early stage of the attack, when the attack traffic is formed
[8].
As a consequence, based on intrinsic property of attack
traffic distribution, we propose a new approach to monitor the
traffic volume (or intensity) on specific network regions for
any sudden subtle changes on some of the links. Depending
on the resolution of the monitoring scheme, this leads to an
early detection of the attack, which we illustrate in this paper.
This paper also provides a functional analysis on how to
assess the impact of the Crossfire attack on the effected
area more realistically instead of over-estimating resources
needed for attack detection and mitigation. We analyze these
challenges in attack preparation and execution of the Cross-
fire attack and exploit them for attack detection. Hence, we
describe a prototypical Crossfire attack detector, which ex-
ploits these vulnerabilities. For this, we utilize two supervised
machine learning approaches: Support Vector Machine (SVM)
and Random Forest (RF) for classification of network traffic
to normal and abnormal traffic, i.e, attack traffic. To show
the feasibility of detection, we report on the trained scenarios
using the link volume as the main feature set. Finally, results
of the attack detector are reported along with some future
directions to improve the detector.
II. MONITORING AND DETECTION APPROACH
A. Monitoring points
Considering the described Crossfire attack execution se-
quence, it turns out that there are potentially four ways to
detect the attack: (a) detection at the traffic flows origin, i.e.,
bot sides, (b) detection at the target area, (c) detection at the
target link, and (d) detection at the decoy servers. Following,
we address the advantages and disadvantages each of the four
ways to finally justify our choice for traffic monitoring.
• Detecting at origin can be the fastest way to stop an
attack before even it is initiated. However, versatility and
spatial distribution of bots (source of the attack traffic)
makes it the most challenging option.
• Detection at target area is the most reasonable approach
as any target areas should be equipped for self defense.
However, assuming not all decoy servers are inside the
target area , early detection is impossible [9].
• Detection at target link might be the simplest form of
detection as simple a threshold based detection system
that could detect the trend of the incoming traffic.
• Detection at decoy servers can be the best approach to
detect Crossfire attack. Assuming the target area is not
far from the decoy servers (3 to 4 hops [4]) detecting at
the decoy servers might reduce the impact of the attack.
Our approach is based on detection at the decoy servers,
because it is the exclusive area that the defender can detect
the attack while actively respond to it. To emphasize the
effectiveness of our detection approach at the decoy servers,
we address the question of where is the best location to probe
the network. In a high resolution, this probing can be placed
either at the target link, before target link or after the target
link. Monitoring a single link as a target link is not considered
as a solution because of two reasons:
• Any links can be targeted for an attack. Therefore,
there should be one-to-one detector for every link in the
network. While, in our proposal there is only one detector
but many probing points.
• Monitoring and detecting based on a single link will fail
in distinguishing between link attack and flash-crowd.
The main goal is to detect the Crossfire attack without
necessity of having the target link info. To find out the best
monitoring domain, we assume to know the location of the
target link for now. The question is which side of the target
link provides more information for detection? Assuming the
number of ports of a switch/router is limited, considering only
Figure 2. A four sub-tree topology of 10 bots, 10 normal clients, and 40 decoy
servers. Each 10 decoy servers connected to a switch is called a sub-tree.
the immediate links before or after the target link might not
help to choose a side. However, getting farther away from the
target link the distribution of the intensity of the traffic on
the links might be a function of the distribution of the end
points. We will show in Section IV-B that more distributed
attack traffic is more difficult to detect.
Depending on the budget of the adversary, the number of
bots purchased for an attack can be in range of thousands
to millions. If the source of the attack traffic, i.e., bots, is
geographically spread out, the variation of the traffic volume
on most of the links is very small (for many routes there might
be only one or few attack flows before they are aggregated at
the target link). That leaves only few link closer to a target
link worth to examine. However, the chosen decoy servers
should not be very far away from the target area (if they are
not inside the target area). Since there are smaller number of
destinations for the attack traffic than the number of sources
of generating them, it can be assumed that the variation of the
volume of the traffic caused by the attack traffic on the links
after the target link is higher than the links before the target
link. Therefore, we suggest monitoring links around servers
or data centers results in better detection than around clients.
The approach of evenly distributing the traffic for decoy
servers [4], might even support the above reasoning and rather
make it simpler to detect some variation on the traffic volume
on several links. The important element in this method is to
be able to monitor the traffic at several links and send the
information to a detector for decision making.
III. EMULATION SETUP
In order to substantiate our discussion from Section IV, we
emulate the Crossfire attack in a realistic test bed environment.
The test bed is implemented in Mininet and the following setup
has been chosen for the emulation environment:
• SDN network created in Mininet.
• SDN switches with POX controller.
• D-ITG traffic generator [10].
• Tree topology (cf. Fig. 2).
• Link bandwidth is set to 2 Mbps with 10 ms delay.
Table I
DIFFERENT VARIATIONS OF THE NETWORK TOPOLOGY.
# of sub-trees # of switches # of decoy servers
2ST 2 9 20
4ST 4 11 40
8ST 8 15 80
• POX controller gets link status every 5 sec from switches.
• Bots generate both normal and bot traffic.
• Some background traffic from clients.
• Some background traffic at the leaf switches (to decoy
servers) to level up the traffic at the edge links.
One focus in this paper is the correlation of the traffic
distribution on the detectability of the Crossfire attack. We
hence used a tree structure as the topology of the network.
This permits us to intuitively expand the topology of the
network, i.e., the tree structure, in order to widen the traffic
distribution. Fig. 2 illustrates a base network for our emulation
in which there exists several sub-trees, each of them includes
10 decoy servers. To investigate different traffic distributions
on the network, we design three variations of this topology as
shown in Table I. Fig. 2 depicts the network topology of 4ST
which includes 4 sub-trees, 11 switches, and 40 decoy servers.
From practical aspect, Mininet with D-ITG traffic generator
have limitation on the size of the network in the emulation.
This is attributes to the fact that we need to reduce CPU
utilization in SDN networks. Hence, the bandwidth of all links
in our emulations are set to 2 Mbps to be able to saturate
the target link with fewer bots and less number of traffic
generators. Moreover, the number of clients and bots are set
to a small number of 10 each, to compromise for a larger
number of decoy server. Nevertheless, bots and clients can
generate traffic in higher rate to rectify the problem.
All switches are SDN switches connected to a POX con-
troller. We modified the POX module flow_stats.py provided
in Github [11], which gives the controller its ability to collect
some port- and flow-based statistics from switches. By using
this code, the controller sends a stat request to all of the
switches connected to the controller every five seconds. The
respond from switches is the number of packets in the buffer
of each port and the number of flows at each link. There are
20 clients in this network including 10 bots (connected to
switches 1 and 2) and 10 normal clients (connected to switches
3 and 4). Clients can be considered as super clients which can
generate traffic with higher rate than a normal client (or bot)
can do.
Bots generate two types of traffic: normal traffic from
beginning to the end of the experiments, and bot traffic which
starts after d seconds and for duration of another d seconds.
For experiments in Section VII, d is set to 5 and to 30 minutes
to have enough samples for the detector.
There is a limited number of traffic types for both normal
and bot traffic. Table II presents all traffic types used in the
experiments. Background traffic (normal traffic) consists of
five application traffic including: Telnet, DNS, CSa (Counter
Strike active player), VoIP and Quakes3, that D-ITG allows us
Table II
PARAMETERS OF THE TRAFFIC.
pkt size (Bytes) rate (pkt/sec)
Type min max min max Protocol Duration
Telnet - - - - TCP 60min
DNS - - - - TCP/UDP 60min
CSa - - - - UDP 60min
VoIP - - - - UDP 60min
Quake3 - - - - UDP 60min
Bot 100 2000 15 200 TCP 5min
Background1 50 1000 1 80 TCP 60min
Background2 10 2500 1 80 TCP 60min
to generate [10]. Both normal clients and bots are using these
traffic to generate background traffic. However, since we could
not specify any inter-departure time nor packet size using these
applications, we use simple TCP requests to generate attack
traffic. To make the two type of traffic indistinguishable, we
add the same TCP traffic to the set of background traffic as
well. This is the requirement of the Crossfire attack in which
background traffic is indistinguishable from the attack traffic.
Although the type of the normal and abnormal traffic should
be the same, the rate of traffic for the two type of traffic
can be different. In reality, the rate of bots’ traffic must be
engineered by the attacker. Here we set the rate base on
the remaining bandwidth of the targeted link after receiving
the normal traffic. The details of the traffic types and their
parameters for the setup in Fig. 2 is given in Table II.
In addition to the traffic generated by the clients and bots,
there are extra traffic generators attached to some of the
switches (mostly leaf switches) to increase the level of the
background traffic at the links. This can be considered as the
traffic coming from another part of the network which is not
in Fig. 2. Since, the number of clients is much less than the
number of servers, the extra traffic generators help to boost
the level of traffic at the edge links connected to the servers.
IV. EMULATION RESULTS
As noted before, the contribution of this paper is to expose
hardships of the Crossfire attack and use them for an early
detection method. We specifically focus on the effect of
bot traffic synchronization on the quality of the Crossfire
attack, and the effect of the distribution of the attack on
detectability of the attack, which we describe in the following
two subsections. Since our focus is on the detection of the
attack, we ignore the first few steps of the Crossfire attack
such link map construction, finding link persistence, or target
link selection. We assume that all attack preparations have
been made and the attacker is ready to attack.
A. Bot traffic synchronization
The topology we use is presented in Fig. 2. At this stage,
to bring down the target link, the adversary only needs to start
the bot traffic and direct it to the decoy servers. Thus, the bot-
master initiates the attack by sending the attack order to the
Command and Control (C&C) server or some selected peers
depending on the structure of the botnet. Bots usually update
each other in a polling or pushing mechanism. However, the
question which is of interest is what happens if bots receive
the attack order in different time order?
When designing Crossfire detection mechanisms, an often
ignored part of the Crossfire attack is the phase from the attack
initiation and the successful impact of the attack [4]. This often
ignored part of the Crossfire attack, which we call it warm-up
period, is the time difference between the time of the first bot-
flow of the attack reaches the target link and the moment the
target link is down. By definition, the attack actually happens
at the end of the warm-up period when the target links are
down. Since, reaching a zero time warm-up period is hard,
this period can be used for early detection and before the
attack successfully takes place.
In fact, for several reasons reaching a zero warm-up time is
hard. One reason could be the dynamic delay of packet arrival
at the target link. That could be because of variations of hop
distances from bots to target link, or the delay in receiving
attack order from the adversary. Any sudden significant change
on traffic volume can be detected by firewalls and IDSs.
Therefore, adversaries gradually increase the attack traffic
volume to prevent being detected. To have a perfect link
failure, the volume of the traffic arriving at the target link
should be slightly higher than the bandwidth of the target link
itself. However, this might not happen immediately. There are
three main reasons for gradual traffic growth:
1) Bot traffic can be originated from any geographical
location in the world and they might arrive at the target
link with different delays (dynamic delay).
2) Since the source of the attack is a botnet, it is reasonable
to assume that there is some time slack between each
bot to start sending the bot traffic. This time slack can
be caused by how bots receive updates from their C&C
center or from other peers in an advanced P2P botnet,
but also from the malware itself [12], [13].
3) Bots might gradually increase their traffic intensity to
prevent detection [4]. This can be considered as the main
reason of gradual increasing the attack traffic volume.
To illustrate the effect of the bot synchronization on the
traffic volume of the target link, the result of an emulated
attack is presented in Fig. 4. A two sub-tree version of Fig. 2
is used to generate above results. At this stage, to bring down
the target link, the adversary only needs to start the bot traffic
to the decoy servers. That means, at this stage, we are only
running the last part of the Crossfire attack. Fig. 4 illustrates
the utilization of the target link before and after the attack.
Different curves in different colors represent different BS time
for bots to generate the attack flow.
In Fig. 4 the red curve is the baseline to show that perfect
attack happens when all the bot traffic simultaneously arrive at
the target link with their maximum intensity. The time interval
which is used in BS in above experiments is in range of 1 to
5 minutes. The reason is that in a p2p platform (the most
recent platform to synchronize Botnets) peers usually contact
each other in range of few minutes [12], [13]. For instance,
Skype peers update only closer peers every 60 seconds [12].
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Figure 3. Bot traffic with various starting points and traffic flow duration.
In other studies like [14], the time synchronization between
bots is reported in range of few milliseconds. However, there
are few steps (three state machine) before they can reach to
that accuracy and those states take sufficiently long (i.e., few
minutes). Therefore we still can assume that there is enough
time in range of few minutes before the real attack takes place.
We are looking here at the time difference between arrival
of the first packet of each bot to the target link. The time
difference between arrival of each packet of any bot traffic
could be in range of milliseconds which is not our concern
here.
Since we are now aware of this possible early detection, we
discuss how to detect an attack which is formed by some low-
intensity non-malicious traffic. The main idea is analogous to
detecting the variation of the volume of the traffic at several
links. Since one cannot gain any information from per flow
traffic monitoring (the attack traffic is benign traffic), and
attack type is a flooding attack, probing the volume of the
traffic at several links might be effective. Although, a single
bot-flow is very small and can be detected neither at IDS nor at
the server, the aggregation of the flows are not small anymore.
All these small traffic flows must be aggregated at the certain
time and place to be able to overwhelm the target link(s).
Another important parameter to generate the bot traffic is the
duration of the attack. Usually, bot-masters (adversaries) tend
to reduce the duration of the attack to prevent being detected.
The combination of the dynamic delay and the attack duration
is difficult to figure out. The attack duration parameter which
is the time difference between the end of the warm-up period
to the end of the attack, is named Dur in our experiments.
In the case of the Crossfire attack, a rolling mechanism
is introduced to keep the attack at the data plane (evade
activating control plane which redirects the traffic) [4]. In
the rolling scheme, a set of target links only be used for a
specific period of time before it switches to another set of
target links. The duration they used in the rolling scheme is
3 minutes. The 3 min is the keep-alive messages time interval
for the BGP algorithm. This duration might be insufficient
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Figure 4. The effect of bot-traffic synchronization on the warm-up period. 2
Sub Trees with different warm-up periods.
when the attacking traffic is gradual because of any of the
above mentioning reasons. This limitation of small duration of
the attack forces the adversary to introduce another delay in
forming the attack which causes a larger warm-up period. The
effect of the length of the attack duration (including warm-up
period) with various BS and Dur parameters are depicted in
Fig. 3. For comparison purpose, the baseline is the case where
bots simultaneously generate traffic (warm-up period is zero)
for an unlimited duration of time. For the other curves, there
are warm-up periods for BS length and duration of length Dur.
Figure 3 shows that, with less synchronized attack traffic,to
have a successful attack, either the duration of the attack
should be prolonged enough to pass the warm-up period or, the
adversary should delay the attack and let the warm-up period
passes before initiating the attack.
Although, the parameters in our experiments are set to small
numbers (few minutes of warm-up periods)1, the result can
generally be extended for longer periods. The main reason of
keeping the simulation time short is limitation of resources in
our setup. Increasing the size and the time of the experiments
reduces the accuracy of the traffic generator [10].
B. Distribution
We discussed the traffic synchronization problem in forming
the attack. The introduction of warm-up period can be used for
early detection of the Crossfire attack which is the topic of the
next section. In this section, we introduce a hypothesis about
the link traffic intensity variation caused by the Crossfire attack
and suggest to use it for detection. We hypothesize that even
if the Crossfire attack is successfully formed by generation of
very low intensity attack traffic, unavoidably there will be a
sudden jump in the traffic on (backbone) links, whereby this
jump will be characteristic for a Crossfire attack.
1There are some technical settings that can be used to support the selection
of the small parameters, such as, in a p2p platform (the most recent platform to
synchronize botnets) peers usually contact each other in range of few minutes
[12], [13], or Skype peers update only closer peers every 60 seconds [12].
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Figure 5. 2 Sub-Trees where jump can be seen at all levels.
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Figure 6. 4 Sub-Trees and jump still visible.
The main objective of the Crossfire attack is to bring down
a set of target links to effect the connectivity of a target
area. Depending on the power of the attacker, the target area
could be cut off completely from the Internet or the quality
of the connection to the Internet could be degraded. Either
way, to bring down the target link the link utilization should
be increased to its maximum capacity. The extra unwanted
traffic at the target link must go through downstream links
and affects their utilization. For instance, the attack traffic at
the target link between switch 5 and switch 7 in Fig. 2 must
pass through the four subsequent links between switch 7 and
downstream switches 8, 9, 10 or 11. This sudden extra change
on traffic has a huge impact on these downstream links and
perhaps the effect goes down further to other links as well.
We will examine this impact through emulation and report all
the results for most of the links below the target link. Then
by expanding the size of the network, we try to hide this
impact by distributing the jump on the target link through more
links. In these experiments, we do not consider the gradual
traffic intensity increase at the bots. All bots send traffic at
the maximum predefined level. The warm-up period is 3 min.
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Figure 7. 8 Sub-Trees where jump at the edge links are not visible.
The first scenario is a two sub-tree network of Fig. 2. In
this scenario, the traffic at the target link can only go through
two other paths. Fig. 5 shows that during the attack time,
the target link is completely utilized and the other two links
underneath of the target link are under influence of the sudden
traffic change. The green line is for the traffic at the edge of
the network where the switch 8 is connected to the Decoy
Server 1. The result of running the similar experiments with
some larger networks is illustrated in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7.
Comparing the link utilization in Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7
shows that increasing the number of branches in the network,
reduces the obvious jump on the downstream links. In particu-
lar in Fig. 7, it is very difficult to distinguish the attack period
only by looking at the edge link (the green line) utilization.
The main point of these experiments is to show that sensing
a similar variation on traffic intensity on multiple links could
be a good indication of Crossfire attack for detection. Since
expanding the network reduces the jump in the link utilization,
the detector must be accurate enough to detect very small
variations of the traffic intensity where cannot be detected by
unarmed human sight.
V. EARLY DETECTION METHOD
A. Warm-up phase
As mentioned, warm-up period is the phase from the attack
initiation and the successful impact of the attack [4]. Early
detection means detecting the attack during this phase when
the attack traffic has reached to the decoy servers but the
network is still operational. We show that by the time the
attack starts the correlation among links to decoy servers
gradually increases during the warm-up period potentially
providing sufficient time and data to detect the attack.
For an effective and early detection, we propose to monitor
the traffic volume and intensity on several links of the network
for simultaneously occurring sudden characteristic change on
some of these links. Based on the awareness of this possible
early detection, we discuss how to detect an attack which is
formed by low-intensity non-malicious traffic.
Figure 8. Link utilization of one link with different attack intensity.
Figure 9. Correlation among links when there are attacks.
Figure 10. Correlation among links when the attack intensity is reduced.
The main idea is analogous to detecting the variation of the
volume of the traffic at several links. Since one cannot gain any
information from per flow traffic monitoring (the attack traffic
is benign traffic), and attack type is a flooding attack, probing
the volume of the traffic at several links might turn out to be
effective. Although a single bot-flow is very small and can be
detected neither at IDS (Intrusion Detection System) nor the
server, the aggregation of the flows is not small anymore. All
of these small traffic flows must be aggregated at the certain
Figure 11. Correlation among links when there is no attack.
time and place to be able to overwhelm the target link(s). This
variation on the traffic volume at several links correlates them
more and this is where the attack can be detected.
B. Experimental results
In this section, we present experimental results to support
the hypothesis of early detection of Crossfire attack based on
the correlation among the links to decoy servers.
The experiments in this section are different in a way that
they are designed to study the correlation among the links with
and without the attack. Thus, the attack traffic is not designed
to overwhelm any target links. The objective of the attack
traffic is to add extra scheduled traffic at all decoy servers.
VI. TOPOLOGY
The same tree with 8-subtrees (80 decoy servers) and the
same traffic types are used. In both experiments, there are a
warm-up period of length 30 samples. The attack intensity
during this period gradually increases at every time sample.
This extra attack traffic for the first experiment (experiment-
1) increases from 300 bps to 600 bps and for the second
experiment increases from 60 bps to 150 bps.
The normalized (l1-norm)2 data of the link utilization of one
link for both experiments is illustrated in Fig. 8. The figure
shows that the attack intensity for the first experiment (green
curve) is higher than the second experiment (blue curve).
Higher link utilization of the second experiment might hide
the small variation of the attack traffic. The warm-up period
for each experiment is highlighted with two parallel line.
Pearson-R is used to measure the correlation among the
links. Correlation is computed for every possible combina-
tion of two links. Since there are 80 decoy servers in our
experiments, there are
∑79
n=1 n = 3160 combination of two
links. Pearson-R returns a single value for two sets of data,
representing how tightly (or loosely) the two sets are corre-
lated together. However, we are interested in observing how
correlation of two links for a duration of the warm-up period
evolves. Therefore, Pearson-R is calculated for a window size
2l1-norm is used only for illustration purpose to preserve the the level of
the link utilization at each experiment.
of 30 (the same size of warm-up period) points. To calculate
the first value of the Pearson-R, there are 29 sample points
before the attack and one sample of the attack in the set. Then,
the window is moved one sample to calculate the second value
with 2 attack samples and 28 samples before the attack. Finally
when the window reaches to the end of the warm-up period, all
30 samples in calculating Pearson-R include the attack traffic.
The result of experiment-1 is reported in Fig. 9 This figure
shows that the correlation constantly increases even for links
that they are not correlated before the attack (sample-2, the
green curve). The average of correlation among all links
(the average over all 3160 pair of links) are presented and
proves the positive effect of the attack traffic in increasing
the correlation among the all links. Figure 10 illustrates the
result of experiment-2, When the attack intensity is reduced.
This attack traffic is not strong enough to affect correlating on
all links. For instance, the Pearson-R value of the two links
in sample-3 curve of the Fig. 10 are changing based on the
background traffic on the links (they are not influenced by the
attack traffic). However, there are some combination of links
that are under influence of the attack traffic. Sample-1 curve
in the same figure is one such example. We observed that the
effectiveness of the attack traffic on the correlation of links is
a function of the intensity of the background traffic. Smaller
volume of attack traffic does not effect the correlation when
there is a large amount of background traffic passing the link.
The results of the link correlation when there is no attack
traffic involved, is reported in Fig.11. The figure shows that
in average the correlation among the links are zero. Although,
there might be some positive correlation among some links
(like sample-2), this is not a general trend in the network.
VII. CROSSFIRE DETECTION WITH MACHINE LEARNING
The Crossfire attack poses great challenges for security
researchers and analysts both in detection and mitigation as
the packets streaming from bots in the network are seemingly
legitimate. While the objective of the Crossfire attack is to
deplete the bandwidth of specific network links, a distinct
traffic flow between each bot to server, i.e., “bot-to-server”
is usually very less intensive flow, and consumes a limited
bandwidth at each link. Thus detecting a single flow (or very
few number of them) at a link is hard to detect and filter. On
the defender’s side, Traffic Engineering (TE) is the network
process that reacts to link-flooding events, regardless of their
cause [15]. As an attacker, we like to hide the variation of
traffic bandwidth as much as possible from the TE module.
The study in this section is to show that if the attacker
distributes the benign traffic effectively enough, the defender
face much trouble to distinguish the attack traffic from normal
traffic when detecting the attack far away from the target link.
Indeed, the analysis, in previous sections, have already
attested the imminent importance of traffic distribution. Fol-
lowing this direction, we leverage state-of-the-art approaches
in machine learning to investigate the effect of traffic distri-
bution in concealing and detecting the Crossfire attack from
available traffic data. To do so, we utilize supervised learning
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Figure 12. Classification result for SVM with different distribution.
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Figure 13. Classification Result for RF with different distribution.
for classification of network traffic to normal and abnormal
traffic, i.e, attack traffic.
A. Learning models
In this paper we attempt to construct a model from big data
collected from network. We utilize two supervised learning
approaches: Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Random
Forest (RF) as they are commonly used machine learning
approaches which have demonstrated effective performance on
different datasets and problems.
SVM: It is known as one of the most powerful and non-
probabilistic binary classifiers which attempts to separate the
two classes of data with a hyperplane in a multidimensional
space of features. We utilize linear-SVM due to its scalability.
RF: Inspired by ensemble learning and bootstrapping, RF
leverages multiple instances of decision trees, where each tree
is built based on a randomly selected portion of training set.
After computing the output of distinct trees, the final decision
is made by aggregation of the outputs via a majority voting
scheme. The Random Forest Algorithm was chosen because
the problem of Crossfire detection has the requirements of high
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Figure 14. The effect of number of features on attack detection for 4-sub-tree.
accuracy of prediction, ability to handle diverse bots, ability to
handle data characterized by a very large number and diverse
types of descriptors.
B. Dataset and feature extraction
We utilized an emulated dataset collected based on the
experiments discussed in Section III. To generate the attack we
used the topology designed and collected the data from distinct
switches. As aforementioned, the objective of this section is
to study the subtle variations in traffic data of the network to
design effective detection approach for the Crossfire traffic.
Therefore we employ the volume of traffic in different links
of the network to construct feature vectors.
We evaluate the performance of the learning approaches
via the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve
(AUC) [16], which illustrates the true positive, i.e., sensitivity,
as a function of false positive, i.e., fall-out.
C. Experimental Results
In this section, we design and analyze experiments to answer
the following questions:
1) What is the impact of distribution of bot-to-server traffic
in the performance of classification algorithms?
2) What is the impact of extracted features in the perfor-
mance of classification algorithm?
3) What is the impact of levels of the links (in a tree
structure) used for feature extraction?
1) The effect of traffic distribution: To examine the impact
of traffic distribution on the detection of the attack, we
conducted experiments in three different topologies designed
in Section III: 2ST, 4ST and 8ST, where the distribution
of traffic increases as the number of sub-trees increases in
the topology of the network. Fig. 12 shows the classification
results of SVM in different settings. As can be seen, the
effectiveness of classification in 8ST is significantly lower than
2ST, and 4ST, which is attributed to the fact that the former
setting utilizes lower flow than the alternative settings during
the attack scenarios. This low amount of traffic as compared
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Figure 15. The effect of number of features on attack detection for 8-sub-tree.
with normal states of the network conceals the attack from the
eyes of the detection approach. Further, the AUC for 2ST and
4ST is neck to neck with a small improvement in 4ST. This
is attributed to the fact that it benefits from more features
as compared to 2ST, i.e., 40 features against 20 features.
Fig. 13 depicts the classification results of RF model for
different traffic distributions. As can be seen from the Figure,
RF demonstrated similar behavior results as that for SVM.
2) The effect of features: Prior studies in data mining have
demonstrated that the performance of classification models
highly depends on the selected features with regards to the
classes. Further, a huge amount of data is required to be con-
tinuously processed as the network is a streaming and dynamic
environment per se, which signify the importance of feature
selection to reduce computational complexity. We hence vary
the number of extracted features and evaluate the performance
of classification algorithm in terms of AUC. Fig. 14 and
Fig. 15 demonstrates the performance of classification for 4ST
and 8ST, respectively. From Fig. 14, we can see that the
classification performance first indicates a positive correlation
with the number of features and then saturates after an optimal
value, i.e., 30 numbers of features. This is an interesting
results verifying that with a too small feature dimension we
would fail to achieve the optimal performance. However, by
only a limited number of features, we can achieve reasonable
performance. This is important as in network environment we
may access to a limited number of links for feature extraction.
Alternatively, Fig. 15 depicts the classification performance for
the 8ST setting. In contrast to 4St, classification of 8St setting
is much lower. This indicates the importance of distribution of
the Crossfire attack where with a enough distribution of attack
standard machine learning approaches would fail to distinguish
Crossfire attack traffic from background traffic.
3) The effect of network visibility: Looking from the net-
work aspect, an important factor for attack detection is the
level of information we can gather about the traffic data of
the network. To examine how features from different levels of
the network affects the performance of traffic classification,
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Figure 16. The effect of higher level features for SVM.
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Figure 17. The effect of higher level features for RF.
we added the volume of one link from the upper level to
the feature vector. More specifically, in 8ST setting, we have
the volume of 80 decoy servers as a feature for the baseline.
We also add the volume of a random link from one level
upper to construct a 81-dimension and 21 -dimension feature
vectors. Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 demonstrate the performance
of classification of traffic data in 8ST setting for SVM and
RF. Only adding one feature from the the upper level, even
if there are less features from the lower level, improves the
performance significantly, which highlights the importance of
extracting features from different part of the network.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Crossfire attack is considered to be one of the most
difficult target-area link-flooding attacks to be detected. The
attack uses a massively distributed large-scale botnet to gen-
erate multiple low-rate benign traffic flows aiming to congest
selected network link with the ultimate goal to disconnect the
target area from the Internet. Although the Crossfire attack
is a tremendous threat to any network, by analyzing the
obtained data we show that the adversary has also substantial
obstacles in the successful attack execution. As a result, this
paper exposes detection vulnerabilities of the Crossfire attack
by showing a correlation between coordination of the botnet
traffic and the quality of the attack, and a correlation between
the attack distribution and detectability of the attack.
We also show that due to the bot synchronization there
is a warm-up period after the attack is launched and before
the target links are overwhelmed. Our results show that this
period can be used for an early attack detection. In this paper
a prototypical Crossfire attack detector is described, which ex-
ploits these vulnerabilities. For this, we utilize two supervised
machine learning approaches: Support Vector Machine (SVM)
and Random Forest (RF) for classification of network traffic
to normal and abnormal traffic, i.e, attack traffic. In particular,
to show the feasibility of detection, we report on the trained
scenarios using the link volume as the main feature set. Finally,
results of the attack detector are reported along with some
future directions to improve the detector.
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